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NOTES 
THE ROLE OF THE AVOIDANCE CANON 
IN THE ROBERTS COURT AND THE 
IMPLICATIONS OF ITS INCONSISTENT 
APPLICATION IN THE COURT’S 
DECISIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
Many have praised Chief Justice Roberts and the Roberts Court for 
its judicial minimalism,
1
 and have noted the Roberts Court’s tendency 
to shape constitutional law at a gradual pace.
2
 One of the tools the 
Roberts Court has used to achieve this result is the avoidance canon, 
which dictates that a court should “adopt one of several plausible 
interpretations of a statute to avoid deciding a tough constitutional 
question.”3 The Roberts Court has invoked this doctrine in many of 
                                                                                                                 
1 See, e.g., Hans Bader, Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB: Narrow Separation-of-Powers 
Ruling Illustrates That the Supreme Court Is Not “Pro-Business”, 2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 
269, 269 (“Chief Justice John Roberts has often been depicted as an advocate of narrow rulings 
and a judicial philosophy of minimalism.”); Randall T. Adams, Note, Recent Development: 
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 135, 135 (2010) (noting a canon of decisions by the Roberts Court “that might be fairly 
characterized as ‘minimalist’”). 
2 See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the 
Roberts Court, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 181, 223 (“If the agenda of the Roberts Court is major 
change in constitutional law, the calculation may be that medicine usually goes down more 
palatably when in small doses.”); Robert Barnes, Roberts Court Moves Right, But with a 
Measured Step, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 2007, at A3 (noting that the Court will move in gradual 
shifts, “rather than by declaring bold breaks with the past”). 
3 Hasen, supra note 2, at 181–182. 
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its decisions, including in high-profile decisions such as Northwest 
Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder 
(“NAMUDNO”).4 During the October 2009 term, however, the 
Court’s decisions in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission5 
and Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board
6
 tested the minimalist reputation of the Roberts Court when it 
decided the constitutionality of the statutes at issue in both cases 
rather than employing the avoidance canon. Richard Hasen has 
labeled the practice whereby “the Court . . . eschew[s] a plausible 
statutory interpretation to decide a difficult constitutional question” as 
“anti-avoidance.”7 These three recent decisions show that, while it 
may be that traditionally “few doctrines are more familiar and 
predictable than the Supreme Court’s practice of avoiding decision of 
constitutional questions,”8 the Roberts Court’s use of the avoidance 
canon has been anything but consistent. 
This Note seeks to explain the Roberts Court’s application of the 
avoidance canon and to understand how these decisions affect the 
validity and legitimacy of the avoidance canon and of the Court itself. 
Part I gives context to the avoidance canon by examining the canon’s 
history, its justifications, and its criticisms. Part II looks at the role of 
the avoidance canon in three of the Court’s opinions. Part II.A 
assesses NAMUDNO and the implausible statutory interpretation the 
Court adopted to avoid deciding the constitutionality of section 5 of 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965. After discussing NAMUDNO, this 
Note will turn to cases where the Court decided the constitutionality 
of a statute rather than using the avoidance canon. In particular, Part 
II.B discusses Citizens United and the Court’s decision to order re-
argument of the case as well as its subsequent decision to overrule 
precedent. Part II.B also focuses on the interplay between Chief 
Justice Roberts’s concurring opinion and Justice Stevens’s dissent. 
Part II.C assesses Free Enterprise Fund and the majority’s decision to 
read a for-cause removal requirement into the statute governing the 
removal of SEC Commissioners in order to hold that the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act’s “dual” for-cause limitation contravened separation of 
powers. Finally, Part III concludes that it is impossible to reconcile 
the Court’s different approaches to the canon and argues that the 
                                                                                                                 
4 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2513 (2009). 
5 130 S. Ct. 876, 889 (2010). 
6 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3147 (2010). 
7 Hasen, supra note 2, at 182. 
8 James A. Gardner, The Ambiguity of Legal Dreams: A Communitarian Defense of 
Judicial Restraint, 71 N.C. L. REV. 805, 809 (1993). 
 2/14/2012 5:00:34 PM 
2012] THE ROLE OF THE AVOIDANCE CANON 847 
inconsistent application of the avoidance canon has damaged the 
doctrine itself and has put its own legitimacy in jeopardy.  
I. BACKGROUND ON THE AVOIDANCE CANON 
A. History of the Canon and Its Evolution 
The avoidance canon is a substantive canon. While many legal 
scholars have traced its history to before Marbury v. Madison,
9
 the 
standard citation for the canon is Justice Brandeis’ concurring opinion 
in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority.
10
 In Ashwander, Justice 
Brandeis summarized seven rules that the Court had implemented in 
“passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed 
upon it for decision”11:  
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of 
legislation in a friendly, non-adversary, proceeding . . .  
2. The Court will not ‘anticipate a question of constitutional 
law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.’ . . .  
3. The Court will not ‘formulate a rule of constitutional law 
broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to 
be applied.’ 
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question 
although properly presented by the record, if there is also 
present some other ground upon which the case may be 
disposed of. . . .   
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon 
complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its 
operation. . . .  
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a 
statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its 
benefits. 
                                                                                                                 
9 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see also Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 
GEO. L.J. 1945, 1948 n.13 (1997) (noting that the Court invoked a version of the avoidance 
canon in Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12 (1800)). 
10 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Brandeis’s explanation of the 
canon has been called “the most significant formulation of the avoidance doctrine.” Lisa A. 
Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003, 1012 (1994). 
11 Id. at 346. 
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7. ‘When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in 
question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is 
raised, it is a cardinal principal that this Court will first 
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly 
possible by which the question may be avoided.
12
 
From these seven rules, Adrian Vermeule extracted three major 
categories of avoidance.
13
 The first category is “procedural 
avoidance,” which suggests that “courts should order the issues for 
adjudication, or the rules that determine the forum in which a case 
should proceed, with an eye to obviating the need to render 
constitutional rulings on the merits.”14 The second category is 
“classical avoidance,” and the third category is “modern avoidance.”15 
The last two categories are different from procedural avoidance in 
that they affect the judicial construction of a statute.
16
 The “classical 
avoidance” approach directs that “‘as between two possible 
interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be 
unconstitutional and by the other valid, [the Court’s] plain duty is to 
adopt that which will save the Act.”’17 In contrast, the “modern 
avoidance” approach provides that “where an otherwise acceptable 
construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, 
the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such 
construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.”18 The 
major difference between classical and modern avoidance, therefore, 
“is in the level of constitutional concern needed to trigger the rule” 
since modern avoidance allows “serious but potentially unavailing 
constitutional objections to dictate statutory meaning.”19 It is 
important to keep in mind that, even though the Court has claimed 
that constitutional avoidance has been applied for so long that its use 
is beyond debate, many scholars have questioned the reasons for its 
use.
20
 
                                                                                                                 
12 Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 346–48 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
13 See Vermeule, supra note 9, at 1948–49 (describing the three categories). 
14 Id. at 1948. 
15 Id. at 1949. 
16 Id. at 1949. (describing the difference between the two types of avoidance). 
17 Id. (quoting Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring) 
(alteration in original)). 
18 Id. (quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades 
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)). 
19 Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1189, 1203 (2006). 
20 See Lawrence C. Marshall, Divesting the Courts: Breaking the Judicial Monopoly on 
Constitutional Interpretation, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 481, 484 (1990) (“[I]t is worthwhile to 
consider how well the canon reflects actual congressional awareness of constitutional issues and 
what kind of constitutional culture it helps create within the halls of Congress.”). 
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B. Justification for and Criticisms of the Avoidance Canon 
1. Justifications for the Canon 
Many scholars have emphasized different justifications for the 
avoidance canon and have long debated its usefulness in 
constitutional law.
21
 While the justifications for the canon are often 
stated differently, the main arguments in favor of its use are the 
promotion of federalism and the separation of powers, the limitations 
of the judiciary, and the importance of constitutional adjudication.
22
 
In contrast, critics of the canon emphasize that modern avoidance can 
actually conflict with legislative intent and that the canon often does 
not prevent the unnecessary creation of constitutional law.
23
 
The first justification for the avoidance canon is that the courts 
should avoid unnecessary questions to maintain the integrity of 
federalism and the separation of powers. Therefore, “to the extent 
Congress or a state is charged with authority in a particular 
substantive area, courts should carefully ensure the ability of these 
actors to interpret the Constitution in their work by not foreclosing 
options.”24 Essentially, this argument for the canon is that courts 
should respect, rather than invalidate, another branches’ constitutional 
determination.
25
 
The second justification for the avoidance canon is that it is 
necessary due to the limitations of the judiciary and the perceived 
fragility of its legitimacy. Justice Brandeis wrote his concurrence in 
Ashwander as a response to the judicial activism of the Court of the 
Lochner era, and his opinion reflected contemporary fears that the 
Court’s credibility was at stake.26 The canon insulates the Court from 
                                                                                                                 
21 Compare Brian C. Murchison, Interpretation and Independence: How Judges Use the 
Avoidance Canon in Separation of Powers Cases, 30 GA. L. REV. 85, 94 (1995) (arguing that 
the avoidance canon “provides a framework for staking judicial ground and exercising 
independent judgment in complex encounters with precedent and the balance of politics”), with 
Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Does Avoiding Constitutional Questions Promote Judicial 
Independence?, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1031, 1036 (2006) [hereinafter Judicial 
Independence?] (noting that “[t]he costs of avoiding constitutional questions are borne too often 
by the poor and marginalized in our society, those most in need of help securing protections for 
their constitutional rights and civil liberties”). 
22 See Kloppenberg, supra note 10, at 1035–54 (analyzing six justifications for the 
doctrine). 
23 See Morrison, supra note 19, at 1209–10 (highlighting the two most common criticisms 
of the canon). 
24 Judicial Independence?, supra note 21, at 1033. 
25 See id. (“Judicial review that invalidates another [branch’s] constitutional work should 
be a last resort . . . .”). 
26 See id. at 1033–34 (noting that “[t]he Ashwander formulation arose in part as a response 
to the activism of the . . . Supreme Court of the Lochner era” and that the fears associated with 
this “animate the general avoidance doctrine . . . ”). 
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Brandeis’ concerns by enabling “the judiciary to render unpopular 
decisions cautiously, rather than suddenly or haphazardly, [which] 
preserves judicial credibility and increases public acceptance of Court 
decisions.”27 
The final justification for the avoidance canon is the “paramount 
importance of constitutional adjudication in our system.”28 This 
concept relies on the perception that the Court’s ability to decide 
constitutional rights may be the Court’s biggest responsibility and 
most important power.
29
 Constitutional adjudication is central and 
crucial to the judiciary because, when a court decides a statutory or 
procedural issue, the result may have an effect on a large number of 
individuals or on the operations of an administrative agency.
30
 
While many scholars have examined the justifications for the 
rules, Richard Hasen came up with three theories that draw on these 
justifications to explain why a Court will decide to invoke 
constitutional avoidance. The three theories are the “fruitful 
dialogue,” “political legitimacy,” and “political calculus” theories.31 
As Hasen notes, it is impossible to know which of these theories is 
correct, and it is possible that more than one theory may come in to 
play in any given case.
32
 Nevertheless, these explanations are helpful 
to provide some framework to understand when and why the Court 
invokes constitutional avoidance. 
The fruitful dialogue rationalization “posits that the Court will use 
constitutional avoidance only when doing so would further a dialogue 
with Congress that has a realistic chance of actually avoiding 
constitutional problems through redrafting.”33 This assumes that if the 
Court avoids deciding the constitutionality of a statute, then it should 
be a signal for Congress to fix that statute.
34
 Hasen’s second 
explanation, the political legitimacy theory, posits that when the 
Court fears that a constitutional decision would harm its legitimacy, it 
will use the avoidance canon to maintain that legitimacy.
35
 This 
explanation seems to come in to play most frequently when the issue 
                                                                                                                 
27 Kloppenberg, supra note 10, at 1044. 
28 Id. at 1046 (quoting Rescue Army v. Mun. Court, 331 U.S. 549, 571 (1947)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
29 See id. (“The Court sometimes claims that the ability to declare constitutional rights is 
the most important power the federal judiciary wields.”). 
30 See id. (“[M]any individual rights depend on administrative and statutory claims.”). 
31 See Hasen, supra note 2, at 183–84 (explaining the three theories). 
32 Id. at 184. 
33 Id. at 183. 
34 See id. (“On this reading, [a statute gets] ‘remanded’ to Congress because Congress 
may fix it in ways that do not violate the Constitution . . . .”). 
35 Id. 
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at hand is controversial, such as abortion or race relations.
36
 The third 
and final explanation is the political calculus theory, which 
hypothesizes that the Court will use constitutional avoidance “to 
soften public and Congressional resistance to the Court’s movement 
of the law in a direction that the Court prefers as a matter of policy.”37 
According to this theory, the Court is able to lay the groundwork for a 
constitutional pronouncement by invoking the avoidance canon and 
then use its power to decide when is it is appropriate to make the 
constitutional decision.
38
  
2. Criticisms of the Canon 
Even though constitutional avoidance is a widely-accepted canon, 
it is not without its critics. One of the main criticisms of the canon is 
that modern avoidance frequently conflicts with the intent of 
Congress.
39
 Courts often think about and approach constitutional 
questions in a very different way than Congress.
40
 When a court 
decides to avoid a constitutional question, it often interprets the 
statute “in ways that its drafters did not anticipate, and, constitutional 
questions aside, in ways that its drafters may not have preferred.”41 
Lawrence Marshall indicates that the extreme version of this criticism 
occurs when a court ignores the plain language of the statute and 
legislative intent to avoid a constitutional issue.
42
 Therefore, for those 
who believe that the federal judiciary should interpret Congress’s 
intent whenever possible, the canon can be extremely problematic 
because of the leeway courts take with statutory interpretation when 
invoking it.
43
  
The second criticism of the avoidance canon is that it does not 
prevent the unnecessary creation of constitutional law; instead, it can 
lead to the over enforcement of the Constitution.
44
 Judge Richard 
Posner, a major critic of the doctrine, contends that avoidance creates 
                                                                                                                 
36 See id. (referring to cases in which the Court used the avoidance canon to avoid 
controversial issues involving race relations). 
37 Id. at 183–84. 
38 See id. at 184 (applying the political calculus theory to NAMUDNO and Citizens 
United). 
39 See Morrison, supra note 19, at 1209 (identifying two criticisms of modern avoidance). 
40 See Marshall, supra note 20, at 489 (noting the difference in values between Congress 
and the Court). 
41 Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 74. 
42 Marshall, supra note 20, at 484. 
43 See id. at 486 (“If one believes that the judiciary’s role . . . is to implement Congress’ 
constitutionally valid choices . . . then the specter of superconstitutional bending of statutes is 
quite problematic.”). 
44 See Morrison, supra note 19, at 1210 (continuing the discussion of the two criticisms of 
modern avoidance). 
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a “judge-made constitutional ‘penumbra’ that basically has the same 
‘prohibitory effect’” as the Constitution.45 Other critics point out that 
when a court uses the avoidance canon, it engages in the 
constitutional issue “enough to supplant its otherwise preferred 
construction of the statute.”46 Basically, a court that wants to avoid a 
constitutional question has to (1) consider the argument to decide if it 
should avoid and (2) ignore the interpretation of the statute that is 
probably correct, which is almost akin to finding that interpretation of 
the statute unconstitutional.
47
 Therefore, “[t]he fact that another, 
different version of the statute survives does not change the reality 
that, in the form that the court would otherwise have applied it in that 
case, the statute has effectively been held invalid.”48 This can lead to 
the distortion of legislative intent in more cases than it would if the 
Court just decided all of the constitutional questions in every case.
49
  
It is important to keep in mind that when a court invokes the 
avoidance canon, it only avoids “some or all of the constitutional 
questions argued” and does not avoid “all decision on the merits of 
the case.”50 The Court, however, “has not invoked the avoidance 
doctrine consistently. It alternatively employs—or ignores—
avoidance to achieve particular substantive outcomes.”51 The Roberts 
Court is not immune from this criticism. The Roberts Court has 
mentioned the avoidance canon in thirteen cases from January 2006 
to June 2009.
52
 Additionally, the Court’s use of anti-avoidance in 
Citizens United
53
 and Free Enterprise Fund
54
 has brought the canon 
to the forefront of discussion once again. Regardless of whether one 
thinks the avoidance canon should have a role in the Court’s decision 
making, the fact is that the Court invokes it frequently and that its use 
signals a Court that is looking to shape law and policy.
55
  
                                                                                                                 
45 Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation – In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 
50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 816 (1983). 
46 Morrison, supra note 19, at 1210. 
47 See Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the 
Preservation of Judiciary Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1582 (2000) (identifying the two 
components of avoidance). 
48 Id.  
49 See Morrison, supra note 19, at 1210 (“[C]ourts applying the canon actually over 
enforce the Constitution.”). 
50 Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the ‘Passive Virtues’—A Comment on Principle 
and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 16 (1964). 
51 LISA A. KLOPPENBERG, PLAYING IT SAFE: HOW THE SUPREME COURT SIDESTEPS HARD 
CASES AND STUNTS THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW 1 (2001). 
52 Hasen, supra note 2, at 192. 
53 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 917–19 (2010) (Roberts, J., concurring); id. at 
936–38 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
54 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3184 (2010) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
55 See Hasen, supra note 2, at 189 (“[T]here seems to be consensus that the canon’s use 
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II. THE ROBERTS COURT’S APPROACH TO THE AVOIDANCE CANON 
IN NAMUDNO, CITIZENS UNITED, AND FREE ENTERPRISE FUND 
The Roberts Court’s decisions in NAMUDNO, Citizens United, 
and Free Enterprise Fund represent three distinct approaches to the 
avoidance canon and illustrate three different views on the role it 
should play in the Court’s jurisprudence. In NAMUDNO, the Court 
enthusiastically invoked the canon and avoided deciding the 
constitutionality of the controversial section 5 of the Voting Rights 
Act (“VRA”).56 However, even though the Court claimed that 
avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions was its “usual 
practice”57 in NAMUDNO, the majority declined to invoke the canon 
in Citizens United.
58
 Instead, despite the dissent’s insistence to the 
contrary,
59
 the majority held that the case could not be decided on 
narrow statutory grounds and proceeded to strike down the statute and 
to overrule two of its previous decisions.
60
 Similarly, the Court did 
not employ the avoidance canon in Free Enterprise Fund, but took 
yet another approach to constitutional avoidance. Even though the 
only reference to the canon was in Justice Breyer’s dissent,61 the 
structure of the Court’s opinion and its interpretation of the statute 
suggest that it ignored the canon and struck down the statute at issue 
to avoid overruling Humphrey’s Executor v. United States62 and 
Morrison v. Olson.
63
  
                                                                                                                 
 
signals a Court that is actively engaged in shaping law and policy, not acting modestly.”). 
56 See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2508 (2009) 
(noting that the Court’s “usual practice is to avoid the unnecessary resolution of constitutional 
questions” and thus the Court “[did] not reach the constitutionality of [section] 5”). 
57 Id.  
58 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 892 (“Though it is true that the Court should construe 
statutes as necessary to avoid constitutional questions, the series of steps suggested would be 
difficult to take in view of the language of the statute.”). 
59 See id. at 936–37 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It is all the more distressing that our 
colleagues have manufactured a facial challenge, because the parties have advanced numerous 
ways to resolve the case that would facilitate electioneering by nonprofit advocacy corporations 
such as Citizens United, without toppling statutes and precedents.”). 
60 Id. at 913 (majority opinion). 
61 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3184 (2010) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The Court then, by assumption, reads into the statute books a ‘for 
cause removal’ phrase that does not appear in the relevant statute and which Congress probably 
did not intend to write. And it does so in order to strike down, not to uphold, another statute. 
This is not a statutory construction that seeks to avoid a constitutional question, but its 
opposite.”). 
62 295 U.S. 602, 631 (1935) (holding that “[w]hether the power of the President to remove 
an officer shall prevail over the authority of Congress to condition the power by fixing a definite 
term and precluding a removal except for cause, will depend upon the character of the 
office . . .”). 
63 487 U.S. 654, 670–77 (1988) (upholding the Independent Counsel Act as 
constitutional). 
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A. Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder 
1. History of the Voting Rights Act 
Section 5 of the VRA,
64
 the statute at issue in NAMUDNO, is 
considered one of the most effective pieces of civil rights 
legislation.
65
 Section 5 was enacted under the Fifteenth Amendment, 
which guarantees that the “right of citizens of the United States to 
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any 
State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”66 
Expounding on this idea, the VRA seeks to ensure that “[n]o voting 
qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or 
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political 
subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of 
the right of any citizen of the United State to vote on account of race 
or color . . . .”67 
Section 5 of the VRA requires “covered jurisdictions” to get 
preclearance from the Attorney General or a declaratory judgment 
from a three-judge district court in Washington, D.C., before they can 
change any aspect of their voting practices, procedures, or 
qualifications.
68
 The covered jurisdictions under the VRA are the 
parts of the country that have a history of voter discrimination,
69
 since 
the overall purpose of section 5 is “to prevent state and local 
governments with a history of discrimination against racial minorities 
from changing their voting rules without first proving that such 
changes would have neither a discriminatory purpose nor effect.”70 To 
obtain preclearance, the covered jurisdiction must show that the 
                                                                                                                 
64 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006). 
65 See Barbara Arnwine, Voting Rights at a Crossroads: Return to the Past or an 
Opportunity for the Future?, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 301, 308 (2005) (quotations and citations 
omitted) (“Indeed, during the reauthorization hearings of 1982, Congress hailed the Voting 
Rights Act as one of the most important civil rights bills passed by Congress and recognized it 
as the most effective tool to protect the right to vote.”). 
66 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
67 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006). 
68 See id. § 1973c (2006) (providing that jurisdictions who wish to enact a “voting 
qualification or prerequisite to voting” may seek a declaratory judgment “that such qualification 
. . . neither has the purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to 
vote . . .”). 
69 See id. § 1973b(b): 
The [VRA’s prohibition on voting tests or devices] shall apply to any State or in any 
political subdivision of a State which . . . maintained on November 1, 1964, any test 
or device, and with respect to which . . . the Director of the Census determines that 
less than 50 per centum of the persons of voting age residing therein were registered 
on November 1, 1964, or that less than 50 per centum of such persons voted in the 
presidential election of November 1964. 
70 Hasen, supra note 2, at 196. 
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purpose of the change is nondiscriminatory and that it will not 
“diminish[] the ability of any citizens . . . to elect their preferred 
candidates . . . ” on account of their race.71 Although section 5 is 
broad, there is a seldom-used “bailout” provision found in section 
4(a) for states and “political subdivisions” seeking exemption from 
the preclearance requirement.
72
 Section 14(c)(2) of the VRA defines a 
political subdivision as a parish, county, or “any subdivision of a 
State which conducts registration for voting.”73 The question of 
whether section 14(c)(2)’s limited definition of a political subdivision 
applied to section 4(a)’s bailout provision was the crux of the Court’s 
decision in NAMUDNO.
74
 
Sections 4 and 5 of the VRA were supposed to be temporary 
provisions and were expected to be in effect for only five years when 
Congress passed the VRA.
75
 Congress reauthorized the VRA, 
however, for five years in 1970, for seven years in 1975, and for 
twenty-five years in 1982. In 2006, Congress passed the Fannie Lou 
Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act 
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, which extended 
section 5’s coverage for another twenty-five years.76 Although the 
VRA has been the topic of a lot of litigation, politically it has not 
been in jeopardy.
77
 The 2006 extension of the VRA passed the House 
of Representatives by a vote of 390-33 with nine abstentions and 
passed the Senate by a vote of 98-0 with two abstentions.
78
 Given the 
politically-sensitive nature of the VRA and Congress’s lack of an 
incentive to take a close look at the intricacies of the legislation, it 
“did not change the coverage formula that determines which 
jurisdictions must engage in preclearance,” nor did it “consider ways 
                                                                                                                 
71 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(b) (2006); see also Hasen, supra note 2, at 195–96 (footnote 
omitted) (“Section 5 of the VRA requires that ‘covered jurisdictions’ obtain preclearance . . . 
before making any changes in voting practices . . . . For each one, the covered jurisdiction must 
demonstrate that the change . . . will not make the affected minority groups worse off.”). 
72 Id. § 1973b(a)(1) (2006) (describing the process required to receive a bailout). 
73 Id. § 1973l(c)(2). 
74 Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2513–16 (2009) 
(discussing the definition of “political subdivision” under section14(c)(2) and holding that it 
does not apply to the term “political subdivision” in section 4(a)). 
75 Id. at 2510 (“As enacted, [sections] 4 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act were temporary 
provisions. They were expected to be in effect for only five years.”). 
76 Id. (“Most recently, in 2006, Congress extended [section] 5 for yet another 25 years.”).  
77 See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 182 (1980) (affirming the 
District Court’s rejection of city’s challenge to the 1982 renewal of the preclearance provision 
of the VRA); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966) (contesting whether 
Congress had “exercised its powers under the Fifteenth Amendment in an appropriate manner 
with relation to the States”). 
78 Govtrack.us, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-9 (last visited Nov. 
7, 2011). 
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to make it easier for jurisdictions” to get bailout coverage when it 
passed the 2006 extension.
79
  
2. Background of NAMUDNO and the Decisions in the Lower Courts 
Shortly after the 2006 reauthorization of the VRA, Northwest 
Austin Municipal Utility District Number One (“District”) brought a 
suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
80
 
The District was created to deliver city services to residents in Travis 
County, Texas, and had a board of five members who are elected to 
staggered terms of four years.
81
 The District did not register voters; its 
elections were run by Travis County for administrative reasons.
82
 
Nevertheless, the District was subject to the preclearance requirement 
of section 5 since it is located in Texas, even though there is no 
evidence that it had ever discriminated on the basis of race.
83
 In its 
lawsuit, the District sought to challenge the constitutionality of the 
preclearance provision of section 5 or, in the alternative, to seek 
bailout coverage as a “political subdivision” covered by section 4(a) 
of the VRA.
84
 In a unanimous opinion written by Judge David Tatel,
85
 
the three-judge district court panel rejected both of the District’s 
arguments and granted the Attorney General’s motion for summary 
judgment.
86
 
The District conceded that it was not a “political subdivision” as 
defined in section 14(c)(2)
87
 since it did not register its own voters, 
but it argued that it qualified as a “political subdivision” in the 
ordinary meaning of that term since it is an “undisputed subunit of 
Texas.”88 To substantiate its argument, the District relied on United 
States v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, Alabama,
89
 in which 
the Supreme Court held that “once a state has been designated for 
coverage, section 5’s preclearance requirement applies to all political 
units within it regardless of whether the units qualify as section 
                                                                                                                 
79 Hasen, supra note 2, at 197. 
80 Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 223 (D.D.C. 
2008), rev’d and remanded by 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009). 
81 Nw. Austin Mun. Utility Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2510 (2009). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 NAMUDNO, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 223. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 283. 
87 Section 14(c)(2) defines “political subdivisions” to mean “any county or parish, except 
that where registration for voting is not conducted under the supervision of a county or parish, 
then term shall include any other subdivision of a State which conducts registration for voting.” 
42 U.S.C. § 1973l(c)(2) (2006). 
88 NAMUDNO, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 231. 
89 435 U.S. 110 (1978). 
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14(c)(2) political subdivisions.”90 The District contended that, when 
Congress passed the 1982 amendments to the VRA to expand bailout 
eligibility to political subdivisions within formally covered 
jurisdictions under section 4(a), Congress had the Sheffield 
interpretation in mind.
91
 Ultimately, the court rejected this argument 
for a number of reasons, including that the District’s definition would 
make the amended statute surplusage,
92
 and that Sheffield related to 
section 5 preclearance rather than section 4(a) bailout.
93
  
To resolve the question regarding the constitutionality of section 5, 
the court had to determine whether to review the statute under the 
rationality test of South Carolina v. Katzenbach
94
 or whether it should 
apply the City of Boerne v. Flores congruence and proportionality 
test, which is a much stricter standard.
95
 Under the Katzenbach’s 
rationality test, because Congress has “full remedial powers to 
effectuate the constitutional prohibition against racial discrimination 
in voting,”96 as long as Congress employs rational means to reach this 
goal, its actions are constitutional.
97
 In contrast, under the City of 
Boerne test, “[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality 
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means 
adopted to that end.”98 Ultimately, the district court concluded that the 
extension of the VRA was constitutional under both standards,
99
 even 
                                                                                                                 
90 Id. at 122; see also NAMUDNO, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 232 (citing Sheffield, 435 U.S. at 
122). 
91 NAMUDNO, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 232. 
92 Id. (“Under the District’s interpretation, this language would be surplusage.”). 
93 Id. at 234 (“As we explained above, Sheffield relates to section 5 preclearance, not 
section 4(a) bailout.”). 
94 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966) (holding that “Congress may use any rational means to 
effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting”). 
95 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (holding that “[t]here must be a 
congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means 
adopted to that end”). 
96 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 326. 
97 Id. at 324 (“As against the reserved power of the States, Congress may use any rational 
means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.”). The 
rational basis test used in Katzenbach derives from the test set forth in McCullough v. Maryland, 
which states: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all 
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, 
but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.” McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819); see Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 326 (quoting 
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421). 
98 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520. 
99 Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 279 (D.D.C. 
2008), rev’d and remanded by 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009) (“[G]iven Congress’s broad authority to 
fashion remedial measures to combat racial discrimination in voting, we decline to second-guess 
its decision to renew coverage and bailout provisions upheld in Katzenbach and City of Rome 
and discussed with approval in the City of Boerne cases.”). 
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if the court thought that the Katzenbach test was the more appropriate 
test for this case.
100
  
In the wake of the district court’s opinion, “voting rights experts 
believed that the statutory bailout argument had no chance when [the 
district court’s decision] was appealed to the Supreme Court. Instead, 
it seemed unavoidable that the Court would address the 
constitutionality of the extension of section 5.”101  
3. NAMUDNO and a Lack of Logic: The Avoidance Canon in 
NAMUDNO 
During oral argument, while the liberal members of the Court 
focused on the District’s bailout argument, the conservative members 
of the Court focused on the constitutionality of section 5.
102
 Justice 
Kennedy’s questions about the scope of section 5’s coverage were 
particularly extensive. He asked seventeen questions at oral argument, 
most of which questioned Congress’s approach in renewing the 
VRA.
103
 At one point, Justice Kennedy said, “[There] is a great 
disparity in treatment, and the government of the United States is 
saying that our states must be treated differently,” and emphasized 
that “[the government has] a very substantial burden if [it is] going to 
make that case.”104 Given the tone of the oral arguments, most Court 
spectators thought that the Court, in a split decision, was going to 
strike down section 5.
105
 Many were surprised, therefore, when the 
Court invoked the avoidance canon as an alternative to deciding the 
                                                                                                                 
100 See id. at 241–46 (discussing why the Katzenbach test is more appropriate for the case 
than the City of Boerne test). 
101 Hasen, supra note 2, at 201–02. 
102 Id. at 202 (footnote omitted) (“At oral argument, Justice Souter pushed the bailout 
argument, but the conservative members of the Court, led by the Chief Justice, focused instead 
on the constitutional questions and severely criticized section 5.”). 
103 Adam Liptak, Skepticism at Court on Validity of Vote Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2009, 
at A16 (“Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, whose vote is likely to be crucial, was a vigorous 
participant in the argument, asking 17 questions that were almost consistently hostile to the 
approach Congress had taken to renewing the act in 2006.”). 
104 Transcript of Oral Argument at 34–35, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 
129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009) (No. 08–322), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-322.pdf. 
105 See Liptak, supra note 103 (noting that section 5 “[was] at substantial risk of being 
struck down as unconstitutional”); Dahlia Lithwick, Spoonfuls of Sugar: Americans’ Continued 
Love Affair with the John Roberts Court, SLATE (Sept. 26, 2009), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2009/09/spoonfuls_of_sugar.ht
ml (noting that most people “widely expected” a decision striking down section 5 of the VRA). 
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constitutionality of section 5.
106
 Justice Thomas was the lone 
dissenter.
107
 
Chief Justice Roberts, who wrote the Court’s opinion, opened the 
discussion by stating that the Court’s “usual practice is to avoid the 
unnecessary resolution of constitutional questions”108 and that “[i]t is 
a well-established principle governing the prudent exercise of this 
Court’s jurisdiction that normally the Court will not decide a 
constitutional question if there is some other ground upon which to 
dispose of the case.”109 Even though the Court made it clear that it 
was invoking the avoidance canon, it still proceeded to raise doubts 
about the constitutionality of section 5.  
Chief Justice Roberts laid out his concerns about section 5 of the 
VRA in a very straightforward manner. While he noted the historic 
context of the VRA and its accomplishments,
110
 he quickly voiced his 
doubt, noting that the conditions under which the statute passed “have 
unquestionably improved” and that “[t]hings have changed in the 
South.”111 He also raised federalism concerns about the statute and 
reminded the parties that section 5, “which authorizes federal 
intrusion into sensitive areas of state and local policymaking, imposes 
substantial ‘federalism costs,’”112 and that “[t]hese federalism costs 
have caused Members of [the] Court to express serious misgivings 
about the constitutionality of [section] 5.”113 In fact, in his dissent, 
Justice Thomas cited some of these same concerns as reasons why 
section 5 is unconstitutional.
114
 Even though Chief Justice Roberts 
stated his concerns about section 5, he invoked the avoidance doctrine 
and decided the case on narrower statutory grounds. 
In deciding NAMUDNO, the Court did not address the district 
court’s constitutional analysis of section 5. The Court, however, 
                                                                                                                 
106 Hasen, supra note 2, at 203 (“In a surprising and relatively short opinion, however, the 
Court on an 8–1 vote decided NAMUDNO on statutory grounds, ruling that the utility district 
was entitled to bail out.”). 
107 Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2517 (2009) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting). 
108 Id. at 2508 (majority opinion). 
109 Id. at 2513 (quoting Escambia County v. McMillan, 466 U.S. 48, 51 (1984) (per 
curiam)). 
110 Id. at 2511 (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 313 (1966)) (“The 
historic accomplishments of the Voting Rights Act are undeniable. When it was first passed, 
unconstitutional discrimination was rampant and the ‘registration of voting-age whites ran 
roughly 50 percentage points or more ahead’ of black registration in many covered States.”). 
111 Id. 
112 Id. (quoting Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 282 (1999)). 
113 Id. (citations omitted). 
114 See id. at 2525 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The lack of sufficient evidence that the 
covered jurisdictions currently engage in the type of discrimination that underlay the enactment 
of [section] 5 undermines any basis for retaining it.”). 
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reversed the district court’s decision that the District did not qualify 
for bailout because section 14(c)(2)’s definition of “political 
subdivision” applied to section 4(a) and the District did not qualify 
under this narrow definition. Instead, the Court held that “the [VRA] 
permits all political subdivisions, including the district in this case, to 
seek relief from its preclearance requirements.”115 However, even 
though the Court went through “a superficial textual analysis of the 
bailout question,” it did not discuss the statutory analysis of the 
district court.
116
 Rather, the Court opened its discussion of the bailout 
provision by conceding that “[t]here is no dispute that the district is a 
political subdivision of the State of Texas in the ordinary sense of the 
term”117 and adding that, in this case, “specific precedent, the 
structure of the [VRA], and the underlying constitutional concerns 
compel a broader reading of the bailout provision.”118  
Ultimately, the Court relied on Sheffield
119
 and Dougherty County 
Board of Education v. White
120
 to support its decision that section 
14(c)(2)’s definition of “political subdivision” did not cover the 
meaning of the “political subdivision” in section 4(a). In Sheffield, the 
Court noted that the definition of “political subdivision” under section 
14(c)(2) “was intended to operate only for purposes of determining 
which political unit in nondesignated States [could] be separately 
designated for coverage under [section] 4(b).”121 Additionally, in 
White, where a school board tried to argue that it did not fall within 
the purview of section 5 because it did not meet the definition of a 
“political subdivision” in section 14(c)(2), the Court noted that “once 
a State has been designated for coverage, [section] 14(c)(2)’s 
definition of political subdivision has no ‘operative significance in 
determining the reach of [section] 5.’”122 Ultimately, these two cases 
supported the Court’s conclusion that section 14(c)(2)’s definition of 
“political subdivision” did not affect the District’s ability to seek a 
bailout under section 4(a).
123
  
To further advance its position, the Court referred to Congress’s 
1982 amendments to the VRA, which “expressly provide[d] that 
                                                                                                                 
115 Id. at 2516–17 (majority opinion). 
116 Hasen, supra note 2, at 204. 
117 NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2513. 
118 Id. at 2514. 
119 435 U.S. 110 (1978). See supra Part II.A.2 for a discussion about the dicta in Sheffield. 
120 439 U.S. 32, 46 (1978) (holding that a county school board is a political subdivision 
within the purview of the Voting Rights Act when it “clearly has the power to affect candidate 
participation in . . . elections,” because to hold otherwise in such a situation “would serve no 
purpose consonant with the objectives of the federal statutory scheme”). 
121 Sheffield, 435 U.S. at 128–29. 
122 White, 439 U.S. at 44 (quoting Sheffield, 435 U.S. at 126). 
123 NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2516–17. 
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bailout was also available to ‘political subdivisions’ in a covered 
State . . . .”124 This meant that “Congress decided that a jurisdiction 
covered because it was within a covered State need not remain 
covered as long as the State did.”125 This interpretation of the 1982 
amendments opened the door for the Court to hold that all political 
subdivisions subject to section 5’s preclearance requirements, and not 
just those covered by the definition of “political subdivision” in 
section 14(c)(2), were eligible to file a bailout suit under section 
4(a).
126
 
4. The Effect of Implausible Statutory Interpretations on the 
Avoidance Canon 
The statutory analysis in NAMUDNO has struck many as 
counterintuitive and illogical. Indeed, Hasen described the Court’s 
construction of the statute as “an implausible reading . . . that 
appeared contrary to textual analysis, congressional intent, and 
administrative interpretation.”127 Another commentator noted that the 
real story from NAMUDNO is “how [the Court] strained the text of 
the statute and the intent of Congress in order to reach its desired 
conclusion.”128 These criticisms of the Court’s opinion in NAMUDNO 
bring to light the problems with the Court’s logic and illustrate the 
negative impact this decision had on the Court and on the canon.  
It is possible that, given the politically charged nature of the VRA, 
the Court was not ready to, or did not have the votes to, strike down 
section 5. By avoiding the issue, however, it still was able to engage 
in a discussion with Congress and the public in general about the 
problems it perceived with the VRA.
129
 This is not the problem with 
the Court’s opinion. The problem is that the statutory argument in 
NAMUDNO was so poorly reasoned that it seemed as though Court 
was trying to figure out a way in which the District could get a bailout 
without deciding the constitutionality of section 5 and without having 
to face the political uproar that would inevitably ensue if it struck 
down the statute. While the canon can help the Court to avoid “a 
fullblown constitutional pronouncement that would harm its 
legitimacy” and to “soften public and Congressional resistance to the 
                                                                                                                 
124 Id. at 2515. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 2516. 
127 Hasen, supra note 2, at 182–83. 
128 Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Understanding the Paradoxical Case of the Voting Rights Act, 
36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 697, 746 (2009). 
129 See Murchison, supra note 21, at 113 (noting that the avoidance canon can facilitate 
“judicial conversation” about problems the judges encounter in their decisions). 
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Court’s movement of the law in a direction that the Court prefers as a 
matter of policy,” the canon does not, and should not, give the Court 
latitude to adopt an unreasonable or implausible statutory 
interpretation.
130
  
When the Court adopts an implausible statutory interpretation, as it 
did NAMUDNO, it may create future problems, as it invites further 
litigation and significantly complicates the Court’s jurisprudence on 
the issue. Unsound reasoning and flawed logic can also hurt the 
Court’s legitimacy as it is much less persuasive and it raises questions 
about the lengths the Court is willing to go to create a consensus or to 
reach its desired outcome. If the Court does wish to use avoidance, it 
should not sacrifice good judgment and well-reasoned decisions. 
The Court’s flawed reasoning in NAMUDNO also hurts the 
avoidance canon because it stretches the canon beyond its scope as “a 
tool for choosing between competing plausible interpretations of a 
statutory text.”131 Accepting the common criticism that the Court’s 
statutory interpretation was not plausible,
132
 the Court appears to have 
stretched the boundaries of the doctrine. If there is no plausible 
statutory interpretation, rather than manufacturing an implausible 
interpretation, the Court should decide the constitutional question at 
issue. The Court should not lean on the avoidance canon to give its 
opinion a façade of reasonableness and legitimacy when it is actually 
violating one of the important principles of the canon. 
B. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission 
1. Background on the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 and 
the Court’s Decisions Leading up to Citizens United 
Congress has been concerned about regulating who may fund 
political campaign ads for a long time. In 1974, Congress passed 
amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”), which 
barred corporations and unions from spending money on certain 
election activities, but still allowed them to set up political 
committees to finance campaigns.
133
 During the 1990s, however, 
people began to question the effectiveness of FECA because of a 
corporation’s ability to evade the statute by producing advertisements 
that seemed to influence federal elections, but that avoided words that 
                                                                                                                 
130 Hasen, supra note 2, at 183–84. 
131 Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005). 
132 See supra notes 129–30 and accompanying text. 
133 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93–443, 88 Stat. 
1263 (1974). 
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would constitute “express advocacy.”134 Due in part to these abuses, 
section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 
(“BCRA”) created a category of “electioneering communications” 
and provided that any corporation that spent money to create these 
communications had to disclose who funded the projects.
135
 The 
BCRA defined an electioneering communication as “any broadcast, 
cable, or satellite communication” that “refers to a clearly identified 
candidate for Federal office” and is aired within thirty days of a 
primary election or sixty days of a general election.
136
  
Multiple plaintiffs have challenged the constitutionality of FECA, 
the BCRA, and other similar state statutes. Prior to Citizens United, 
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce
137
 was the leading case 
about the constitutionality of a statute that limited a corporation’s 
ability to spend money in an election. The statute at issue in Austin 
was a Michigan statute that “prohibit[ed] corporations from making 
contributions and independent expenditures in connection with state 
candidate elections.”138 In a 6-3 decision,139 the Court held that the 
statute’s limits on corporate spending on “express advocacy” did not 
violate the First Amendment because the statute was supported by the 
compelling government interest of preventing political corruption and 
the statute was narrowly tailored to that purpose.
140
  
While Austin dealt with a state statute, it affected the Court’s 
subsequent decisions involving federal restraints on corporate 
spending in political campaigns. In McConnell v. Federal Election 
Commission,
141
 the plaintiffs challenged section 203 of the BCRA. In 
its decision, the Court relied on Austin to uphold the constitutionality 
of restrictions on corporate spending in federal elections. The Court 
reiterated that it has “repeatedly sustained legislation aimed at ‘the 
corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth 
that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have 
little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s 
political ideas’”142 and that Congress could limit the advertisements at 
issue since they were “the functional equivalent of express 
                                                                                                                 
134 Hasen, supra note 2, at 207. 
135 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub L. No. 107–155, 116 Stat. 81, 91 
(2002). 
136 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A) (2006). 
137 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
138 Id. at 655. 
139 Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justices Brennan, White, Blackmun, and Stevens joined. Justices Scalia, Kennedy and 
O’Connor dissented. Id. at 654. 
140 Id. at 659–61. 
141 540 U.S. 93, 102 (2003). 
142 Id. at 205 (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 660). 
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advocacy.”143 While the Court took consistent approaches in 
McConnell and Austin, its decision in Wisconsin Right to Life v. 
Federal Election Commission
144
 signaled that trouble loomed ahead 
for limitations on corporate independent expenditures for 
electioneering communications. 
In Wisconsin Right to Life, the Court faced yet another challenge 
to section 203 of the BCRA. The case involved a corporate-funded 
broadcast advertisement that mentioned Senators Feingold and Kohl’s 
positions on judicial filibusters, which was to be aired shortly before 
the primary elections.
145
 In a 5-4 decision, the Court noted that the 
First Amendment required it “to err on the side of protecting political 
speech rather than suppressing it” and held that section 203 was 
unconstitutional as applied to the ads in the case since the 
advertisements at issue were not the “functional equivalent” of 
express campaign speech.
146
 This decision marked a shift in the 
Court’s approach to the BCRA, and shortly after the decision Citizens 
United provided the Court with another opportunity to consider the 
constitutionality of the BCRA. 
2. The Origin of Citizens United and its Path to the Supreme Court 
In 2008, Citizens United, “a nonprofit ideological corporation (but 
one that took some for-profit corporate funding),” produced a 
documentary called Hillary: The Movie.
147
 The documentary 
mentioned then-Senator Hillary Clinton by name and included 
interviews with people who were critical of her.
148
 While the 
documentary did come out in theaters, the trouble started when 
Citizens United wanted to broadcast the documentary on cable 
television through a video-on-demand service within thirty days of 
the 2008 primary elections.
149
 Citizens United, however, “feared . . . 
that both the film and the ads would be covered by [section 203’s] 
ban on corporate-funded independent expenditures, thus subjecting 
the corporation to civil and criminal penalties.”150 Accordingly, 
Citizens United sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the 
Federal Election Commission (“FEC”), arguing that certain 
                                                                                                                 
143 Id. at 206. 
144 551 U.S. 449 (2007) 
145 Id. at 458–59. 
146 Id. at 457. 
147 Hasen, supra note 2, at 210. 
148 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 887 (2010). 
149 Id. at 888. 
150 Id. 
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provisions of the BCRA were unconstitutional, including section 203, 
as applied to its documentary.
151
 
The three-judge court in the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia denied Citizens United’s motion for a 
preliminary injunction and granted the FEC’s motion for summary 
judgment.
152
 The court held that section 203 was both facially 
constitutional under McConnell and constitutional as applied to 
Hillary.
153
 In reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized that the 
content of Hillary was “susceptible of no other interpretation than to 
inform the electorate that Senator Clinton is unfit for office, that the 
United States would be a dangerous place in a President Hillary 
Clinton world, and that viewers should vote against her.”154  
3. Re-Argument and the Majority’s Reasoning: The Overruling of 
Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce and McConnell v. 
Federal Election Commission 
Citizens United appealed the district court’s decisions and, in 
March 2009, argued its case before the Supreme Court. However, the 
Court announced it would rehear the case in September 2009 and 
asked for supplemental briefing on the facial validity of section 203 
and on whether the Court should overrule either Austin, McConnell, 
or both.
155
 Just over four months later, “a bitterly divided”156 Court 
announced, in a sweeping 5-4 decision, that section 203’s restrictions 
on corporate independent expenditures were unconstitutional and 
overruled Austin and McConnell.
157
 
Before Justice Kennedy, who wrote for the majority, reached the 
question of the constitutionality of section 203 and the validity of 
Austin and McConnell, he took time to explain why the Court could 
not decide the case on narrower statutory grounds. The Court rejected 
Citizens United’s argument that Hillary did not fall under the 
definition of an electioneering communication since the documentary 
would most likely be seen only by one household and not more than 
                                                                                                                 
151 Id. 
152 Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 275 (D.D.C. 2008), rev’d and remanded 
by 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).  
153 Id. at 280. 
154 Id. at 279. 
155 Hasen, supra note 2, at 212. 
156 Adam Liptak, Justices, 5–4, Reject Corporate Spending Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 
2010, at A1. Citizens United also challenged the BCRA’s disclaimer and disclosure 
requirements as applied to Hillary and to the ads for the movie. The Court held that the BCRA’s 
disclaimer and disclosure requirements still applied to ads and the documentary as “there [had] 
been no showing that, as applied in this case, [those] requirements would impose a chill on 
speech of expression.” Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010). 
157 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913. 
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50,000 people as the statute required.
158
 To the contrary, the Court 
found that the number of viewers the statute requires is determined by 
the number of cable subscribers in the pertinent area, which in this 
case well exceeded the 50,000-person requirement.
159
 The Court also 
rejected Citizens United’s argument that section 203 did not apply to 
Hillary under Wisconsin Right to Life, because “there [was] no 
reasonable interpretation of Hillary other than as an appeal to vote 
against Senator Clinton” and, therefore, the documentary qualified 
“as the functional equivalent of express advocacy.”160 Citizens United 
argued, thirdly, that the statute should not apply to movies broadcast 
through video-on-demand since “this delivery system has a lower risk 
of distorting the political process than do television ads.”161 This 
argument did not persuade the Court as it noted that “any effort by the 
Judiciary to decide which means of communications are to be 
preferred . . . would raise questions as to the court’s own lawful 
authority.”162 Finally, the Court refused to carve out an exception for 
nonprofit corporate political speech funded “overwhelmingly by 
individuals” since it would require an in-depth, “case-by-case 
determination[] to verify whether political speech is banned.”163  
After rejecting Citizens United’s statutory arguments, the Court 
explained that it could not “resolve this case on a narrower ground 
without chilling political speech . . . that is central to the meaning and 
purpose of the First Amendment.”164 Accordingly, the Court felt that 
it had to reconsider the Court’s decisions in Austin and McConnell 
and the constitutionality of section 203’s expenditure ban.165 The 
Court premised this bold decision to revisit precedent and decide the 
constitutionality of the statute at issue by emphasizing that “[i]t is not 
judicial restraint to accept an unsound, narrow argument just so the 
Court can avoid another argument with broader implications.”166 And, 
with that, the same Court that seemed so reluctant to address the 
constitutionality of section 5 of the VRA in NAMUDNO and that 
enthusiastically endorsed the avoidance canon, proceeded to ignore 
the avoidance canon and to rewrite the Court’s approach to corporate 
campaign spending. 
                                                                                                                 
158 Id. at 888–89. 
159 Id. at 889. 
160 Id. at 890. 
161 Id.  
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 891–92. 
164 Id. at 892. 
165 Id. at 893–94. 
166 Id. at 892. 
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The Court first considered the validity of Austin and noted two 
conflicting lines of precedent. One of these lines, which includes 
cases such as Buckley v. Valeo
167
 and First National Bank v. 
Bellotti,
168
 “forbid[s] restrictions on political speech based on the 
speaker’s corporate identity”; in contrast, the Austin line of cases 
permits these types of restrictions.
169
 Ultimately, the Court decided 
that the Buckley and Bellotti line of cases adopted the correct 
approach to the First Amendment and overruled Austin, noting that 
“[n]o sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political 
speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.”170 The Court did not 
stop after overruling Austin; it proceeded to overrule the section of 
McConnell that upheld section 203 because the McConnell Court 
relied on Austin “to uphold a greater restriction on speech than the 
restriction upheld in Austin.”171 
4. Dueling Opinions: Justice Roberts’s Concurrence and Justice 
Stevens’s Dissent 
All opinions have weaknesses, including the Court’s opinion in 
Citizens United, but Justice Stevens’s dissent and Chief Justice 
Roberts’s concurrence exacerbated the opinion’s flaws. While Justice 
Stevens disagreed with the majority’s approach on a number of 
grounds, one of his major contentions was the Court’s disregard for 
the avoidance canon. He outlined various approaches the Court could 
have taken, such as deciding the case on narrow statutory grounds and 
holding that a documentary shown through video-on-demand did not 
qualify as an “electioneering communication” under the BCRA.172 In 
Justice Stevens’s mind, by bypassing these narrower grounds, the 
Court transgressed a ‘“cardinal’ principle of the judicial process: ‘[I]f 
it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide 
                                                                                                                 
167 424 U.S. 1, 58 (1976) (striking down the expenditure ban in the Federal Election 
Campaign Act of 1971, which applied to corporations and unions). 
168 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978) (holding that there is “no support in the First Amendment, or 
in the decisions of this Court, for the proposition that speech that otherwise would be within the 
protection of the First Amendment loses that protection simply because its source is a 
corporation”). 
169 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903 (noting that, whereas the “pre-Austin line [of cases] 
forb[ade] restrictions on political speech based on the speaker’s identity,” the “post-Austin line 
permit[ed] them”). 
170 Id. at 913. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. at 937 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 937–38 (describing three narrower 
approaches the majority could have adopted in Citizens United and noting that the “brief tour of 
alternative grounds . . . is meant to show that there were principled, narrower paths that a Court 
that was serious about judicial restraint could have taken”). 
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more.”173 He also emphasized “[t]he elementary rule . . . that every 
reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute 
from unconstitutionality.”174 Although he did not use Ashwander’s 
standard citation to the avoidance canon or invoke the canon by 
name, his dissent strongly alluded to the canon and implied that the 
majority’s sole reason for not employing the canon was that “five 
Justices were unhappy with the limited nature of the case before [the 
Court], so they changed the case to give themselves an opportunity to 
change the law.”175 
Many commentators believe that the critical tone Justice Stevens’s 
dissent prompted Chief Justice Roberts to write a concurring 
opinion.
176
 Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence vigorously defended 
the majority’s opinion and attempted to combat Justice Stevens’s 
accusations of judicial activism.
177
 He reaffirmed the Court’s 
commitment to the avoidance canon
178
 and emphasized its willingness 
to invoke the canon when appropriate by citing its decision in 
NAMUDNO.
179
 Chief Justice Roberts noted, however, that the Court’s 
approach in Citizens United was consistent with the avoidance canon 
as it addressed the statutory arguments first and did not move on to 
the constitutional arguments until it addressed, and rejected, Citizens 
United’s statutory claim that section 203 did not apply to Hillary.180 
Although the Court decided the constitutionality of the statute, it did 
so because the Court should not let the “practice of avoiding 
unnecessary (and unnecessarily broad) constitutional holdings . . . 
trump[] [its] obligation faithfully to interpret the law” and because it 
                                                                                                                 
173 Id. at 937 (quoting PDK Labs., Inc. v. United States, 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 
2004) (Roberts, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). 
174 Id. (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
175 Id. at 932. 
176 See Adam Liptak, Justices Turn Minor Movie Case Into a Blockbuster, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 23, 2010, at A13 (noting that “[t]he chief justice’s decision to respond separately indicated 
that ‘he felt the sting of Stevens’s dissent”’); Richard Hasen, Chief Justice Roberts’ Concurring 
Opinion in Citizens United: Two Mysteries, ELECTION LAW BLOG (Jan. 23, 2010), 
http://electionlawblog.org/archives/015118.html (suggesting that Chief Justice Roberts “felt 
compelled to write once he saw the Justice Stevens dissent”). 
177 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 917 (Roberts, J., concurring) (“I write separately to 
address the important principles of judicial restraint and stare decisis implicated in this case.”). 
178 See id. at 918 (citations omitted) (“Because the stakes are so high, our standard practice 
is to refrain from addressing constitutional questions except when necessary to rule on particular 
claims before us. This policy underlies . . . our willingness to construe ambiguous statutes to 
avoid constitutional problems . . . .”). 
179 See id. (“If there were a valid basis for deciding the statutory claim in Citizens United’s 
favor (and thereby avoiding constitutional adjudication), it would be proper to do so. In deed 
that is precisely the approach the Court took just last Term in [NAMUDNO].”). 
180 See id. (“It is only because the majority rejects Citizens United’s statutory claim that it 
proceeds to consider the group’s various constitutional arguments . . . .”). 
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“cannot embrace a narrow ground of decision simply because it is 
narrow; it must also be right.”181  
5. The Court’s Flawed Approach to the Avoidance Canon in Citizens 
United 
There are two major flaws with the Court’s opinion and approach 
to the avoidance canon in Citizens United. First, if the majority did 
not adhere to the avoidance canon to promote a political agenda as 
Justice Stevens suggested, then the Court’s failure to adhere to the 
canon undermines its usefulness as a substantive canon. The Court 
seemed to go out of its way to order re-argument and to dismiss 
Citizens United’s statutory arguments so that it could decide the 
constitutionality of section 203 and overrule Austin and McConnell.
182
 
In the process of accomplishing this desired result, the Court 
deliberately ignored the avoidance canon and crafted ways to dismiss 
valid statutory arguments. The Court’s approach in Citizens United 
undermined the essence of the avoidance canon since it failed to 
adopt plausible statutory arguments. This type of manipulation and 
inconsistent use of avoidance damages the utility and value of the 
canon because it transforms the canon from a valid and important 
presumption into a random citation void of any meaningful principle.  
The second flaw with the Court’s approach is that, even if one 
thinks that the majority’s decision was correct, and that the avoidance 
canon was not applicable, the concurring and dissenting opinions in 
Citizens United still negatively affected the value of the avoidance 
canon and hurt the public’s perception of the Court. While dissenting 
justices typically point out different arguments and address some of 
their problems with the majority’s opinion, the tone of Justice 
Stevens’s dissent in Citizens United was exceedingly harsh and 
critical and questioned not only the majority’s reasoning, but its 
motives and judicial philosophy as well. Chief Justice Roberts’s 
concurring opinion likely did nothing to improve the public’s 
perception of the Court, either, as his defensive concurrence further 
highlighted the ideological divide between majority and dissenting 
justices. While debate is healthy, excessive personal attacks against 
other justices and the majority’s reasoning may create a public 
perception that the Court is a fractured institution and may cause the 
                                                                                                                 
181 Id. at 919. 
182 See id. at 938 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The only thing preventing the majority from 
affirming the District Court, or adopting a narrower ground that would retain Austin, is its 
disdain for Austin.”); id. at 941–42 (“In the end, the Court’s rejection of Austin and McConnell 
comes down to nothing more than its disagreement with their results.”). 
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public to question the validity of the Court’s decisions. This type of 
infighting exposes the weaknesses of the avoidance canon. The 
justices’ debate about the canon showed just how susceptible it is to 
various interpretations. The debate also highlights that, like other 
substantive canons, the avoidance canon can be easily manipulated as 
its application is dependent on the justices’ judicial and political 
views. By revealing the discretionary nature of the canon, the Court 
diminishes its persuasiveness, and, as a consequence, decreases its 
usefulness. 
C. Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board 
1. A Look at the Court’s Removal Power Jurisprudence 
Article II of the Constitution provides that “[t]he executive Power 
shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.”183 At 
the time the first executive departments were created, the prevailing 
view was that “the executive power included a power to oversee 
executive officers through removal” since it was “a traditional 
executive power” that was not expressly taken away from the 
President.
184
 Nevertheless, Congress began to pass statutes that 
limited the President’s power to remove various categories of 
officers, and it was left up to the Court to decide which types of 
limitations were permissible. 
In the first major case regarding the removal of executive officers, 
Myers v. United States,
185
 the Court contemplated the constitutionality 
of a statute limiting the President’s power to remove a postmaster. 
The Court struck down the statute, explaining that it was essential that 
the President have the power to remove “those for whom he cannot 
continue to be responsible.”186 As Justice Breyer noted in his dissent 
in Free Enterprise Fund, the Myers decision “cast serious doubt on 
the constitutionality of all ‘for cause’ removal provisions . . . .”187 
Nine years after Myers, the Court decided Humphrey’s Executor v. 
United States.
188
 In Humphrey’s Executor, the Court addressed the 
constitutionality of a statute providing that the President could only 
                                                                                                                 
183 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
184 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3152 (2010). 
185 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
186 Id. at 117.  
187 Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3183 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see infra Part II.C.4 for a 
discussion of how the Myers decision can explain the absence of a “for cause” provision in the 
statute creating the SEC. 
188 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
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remove members of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) during 
their seven-year terms for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or 
malfeasance in office.”189 Rather than gravitating towards its 
reasoning in Myers, the Court in Humphrey’s Executor sought to 
distinguish the facts at issue from those in Myers. The Court reasoned 
that the FTC performed a “quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial” 
function rather than the executive function that the postmaster served 
in Myers; therefore, Congress could require it to act independently 
from the executive branch.
190
 Given this distinction, the Court upheld 
the removal provision, holding that Congress had the power to “fix 
the period during which [the members of the FTC could] continue in 
office, and to forbid their removal except for cause in the 
meantime.”191 
Decades after Humphrey’s Executor, the Court decided Morrison 
v. Olson,
192
 which concerned the Ethics in Government Act.
193
 This 
Act permitted a special court to appoint an independent counsel to 
investigate and prosecute alleged federal criminal activities of high 
executive officers.
194
 The independent counsel, however, could be 
removed by the Attorney General only “for good cause.”195 In a 7-1 
decision,
196
 the Court sustained the statute.
197
 In its opinion, the Court 
noted that, because the Attorney General is under the direct control of 
the President, “[t]his [was] not a case in which the power to remove 
an executive official [had] been completely stripped from the 
President . . . .”198 Additionally, because the independent counsel 
could be terminated for cause, “the Executive, through the Attorney 
General, retain[ed] ample authority to assure that the counsel [was] 
competently performing his or her statutory responsibilities . . . .”199  
While the Court did not address the validity of its decision in 
Morrison or its other decisions involving the removal power in Free 
Enterprise Fund because “[t]he parties [did] not ask [them] to 
reexamine any of [those] precedents,” these decisions establish the 
framework in which the Court was operating.
200
 Additionally, these 
                                                                                                                 
189 Id. at 620 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
190 Id. at 629. 
191 Id. 
192 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
193 Pub. L. No. 95–521, 92 Stat. 1867 (1978) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 591 et. seq. (2006)). 
194 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 660 (citation omitted).. 
195 Id. at 663 (citation omitted).. 
196 Id. at 658. 
197 Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in which no other justices joined and Justice 
Kennedy took no part in the decision. Id. at 697 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
198 Id. at 692 (majority opinion). 
199 Id. 
200 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3147 (2010). 
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decisions may help to explain why the Court ignored the avoidance 
canon and decided the constitutionality of the statute at issue. 
2. The Creation and Function of the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board 
In the wake of the Enron and WorldCom accounting scandals, 
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
201
 which sought to 
reform corporate America and its accounting practices.
202
 As part of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress created the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (“Board”) “to oversee the audit of public 
companies that are subject to the securities laws, and related matters, 
in order to protect the interests of investors and further the public 
interest in the preparation of informative, accurate, and independent 
audit reports.”203 This broad grant of power enabled the Board to 
“regulate every detail of an accounting firm’s practice, including 
hiring and professional development, promotion, supervision of audit 
work, the acceptance of new business and the continuation of old, 
internal inspection procedures, [and] professional ethics rules . . . .”204 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) appoints the 
five members of the Board for five-year terms “after consultation 
with the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
and the Secretary of the Treasury . . . ”; vacancies are filled by the 
same process.
205
 When the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was adopted, the 
Board members could be removed only by the SEC and only for good 
cause: committing willful violations of the Act, abusing their 
authority, or unreasonably failing to enforce compliance with rules or 
professional standards.
206
 Furthermore, the SEC benefitted from far-
reaching oversight powers of the Board.
207
 However, this system of 
for-cause removal changed with the Court’s decision in Free 
Enterprise Fund. 
                                                                                                                 
201 Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 
28 and 29 U.S.C.). 
202 See Floyd Norris & Adam Liptak, Court Backs Accounting Regulator, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 29, 2010, at B1 (noting that “the Sarbanes-Oxley Act . . . sought to reform corporate 
America after the Enron and WorldCom accounting scandals”). 
203 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a) (2006). 
204 Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3148. 
205 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(1), (e)(4)(A), (e)(5)(A). 
206 15 U.S.C. § 7217(d)(3). 
207 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 7217(b)(2) (“[n]o rule of the board shall become effective without 
prior approval of the Commission . . . .”). 
 2/14/2012 5:00:34 PM 
2012] THE ROLE OF THE AVOIDANCE CANON 873 
3. The Origins of Free Enterprise Fund and the Decisions by the 
Lower Courts 
In 2004, the Board inspected Beckstead & Watts, LLP, a small 
Nevada accounting firm. The Board decided that there were some 
deficiencies with its auditing procedures and began a formal 
investigation.
208
 Subsequently, Beckstead & Watts and Free 
Enterprise Fund
209
 brought suit in the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia arguing that the Board was 
unconstitutional.
210
  
The plaintiffs set forth two main arguments. First, they contended 
that the Board’s structure violated the Appointments Clause, which 
“empowers the President to appoint ‘Officers of the United States,’ 
while allowing Congress to vest the appointment of ‘inferior Officers’ 
in the President, Courts of Law, or Heads of Departments.”211 They 
argued that the members of the Board were not inferior officers 
because they were not supervised regularly by principal officers who 
report directly to the President and, therefore, the members of the 
Board had to be appointed by the President.
212
 In the alternative, the 
plaintiffs alleged that, even if the members of the Board were inferior 
officers, the SEC could not appoint them because it is not a 
“Department,” and the appointment power had to be vested in the 
SEC chair rather than the entire SEC.
213
 Second, the plaintiffs 
asserted that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act “contravened the separation of 
powers by conferring wide-ranging executive power on Board 
members without subjecting them to Presidential control.”214 The 
district court granted the Board’s motion for summary judgment, and, 
in a 2-1 decision,
215
 the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.216  
The Court of Appeals focused on the structure of removal, as well 
as that Board members could only be removed by the SEC for good 
cause and that, in turn, the SEC’s Commissioners could only be 
                                                                                                                 
208 Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3149. 
209 Free Enterprise Fund is a nonprofit organization that supports economic growth and 
limited government. Beckstead & Watts is a member of the Free Enterprise Fund. Leading 
Cases, 124 HARV. L. REV. 179, 290 (2010). 
210 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., Civil Action No. 06–0217 
(JR), 2007 WL 891675, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2007), aff’d, 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). 
211 Id. at *4 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2). 
212 Id.  
213 Id.  
214 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3149 (2010). 
215 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 668 (D.C. Cir. 
2008) aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). 
216 Id. at 685. 
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removed by the President for good cause.
217
 It stated that this “double 
for-cause limitation on removal” was “a question of first impression” 
since neither the Court of Appeals nor the Supreme Court had 
“considered a situation where a restriction on removal pass[ed] 
through two levels of control.”218 Ultimately, however, the court held 
that, despite the double for-cause limitation, the removal structure 
“[did] not strip the President of sufficient power to influence the 
Board and thus [did] not contravene separation of powers. . . .”219 
While the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court in a 5-4 
decision,
220
 it did utilize the Court of Appeals’ focus on double for-
cause limitation on removal as grounds for distinguishing Free 
Enterprise Fund from existing precedent and as a means to strike 
down the removal provision in the statute. 
4. The Court’s Decision and the Debate Surrounding the Avoidance 
Canon in Free Enterprise Fund 
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, opened his opinion 
with a brief overview of Myers, Humphrey’s Executor, and Morrison, 
but quickly distinguished these cases from the fact pattern in Free 
Enterprise Fund. Roberts adopted the appellate court’s determination 
that this situation was one of first impression for the Court as it 
involved a removal restriction that passed through two levels of 
control whereas the Court’s previous decisions involved a removal 
restriction with only one level of control.
221
 For the Court, this “added 
layer of tenure protection [made] a difference.”222 Ultimately, because 
the Act “subvert[ed] the President’s ability to ensure that the laws 
[were] faithfully executed,”223 the Court held that this dual for-cause 
limitation structure was “contrary to Article II’s vesting of the 
executive power in the President”224 and “contraven[ed] the 
Constitution’s separation of powers.”225 The details of the Court’s 
                                                                                                                 
217 Id. at 668–69. 
218 Id. at 679. 
219 Id. at 669. 
220 Justices Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito joined the opinion of the Court. 
Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor 
joined. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3146. 
221 See id. at 3147 (“We are asked . . . to consider a new situation not yet encountered by 
the Court. The question is whether these separate layers of protection may be combined.”); id. at 
3153 (quoting Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 679) (“Morrison did not . . . address the 
consequences of more than one level of good-cause tenure-leaving the issue, as both the court 
and dissent below recognized, a ‘question of first impression’ in this Court.”). 
222 Id. at 3153. 
223 Id. at 3155. 
224 Id. at 3147. 
225 Id. at 3151. 
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analysis are irrelevant for the purposes of an analysis of the avoidance 
canon, as Chief Justice Roberts did not mention the avoidance canon 
in his opinion. Justice Breyer’s dissent, however, briefly alluded to 
the role that avoidance could have played in the Court’s decision. 
While Justice Breyer’s dissent focused on the various problems he 
perceived in the majority’s opinion,226 he questioned how the Court 
could “simply assume” that the SEC Commissioners were removable 
only for cause.
227
 The majority assumed that SEC Commissioners 
could only be removed for cause because the statute establishing the 
SEC is completely silent on the question of removal.
228
 Justice Breyer 
noted that the statute’s silence on removal was intentional as 
Congress created the SEC in the nine-year period between Myers and 
Humphrey’s Executor, when there was “doubt on the constitutionality 
of all ‘for cause’ removal provisions” and “at a time when, under 
[the] Court’s precedents, it would have been unconstitutional to make 
the Commissioners removable only for cause.”229 Ultimately, Justice 
Breyer concluded that the majority read a for-cause removal 
requirement into the statute “to strike down, not to uphold, another 
statute,”230 which “is not a statutory construction that seeks to avoid a 
constitutional question, but its opposite.”231 Although Justice Breyer’s 
reference to the avoidance canon is brief, it raises questions about 
why the Court read a for-cause requirement into the statute and 
determined the constitutionality of the statute at issue, rather than 
invoking the avoidance canon. 
5. The Function and Influence of Constitutional Avoidance in Free 
Enterprise Fund 
The operation, and influence, of the avoidance canon in Free 
Enterprise Fund is not as obvious as in other cases since the Court 
appears to have not adhered to the canon to avoid overruling 
precedent. Since Morrison, the composition of the Court has changed 
dramatically. Only Justices Kennedy and Scalia were members of the 
                                                                                                                 
226 See id. at 3170 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court “should decide the 
constitutional question in light of the provision’s practical functioning in context”); see also id. 
at 3171 (emphasis in original) (arguing that “the Court fails to show why two layers of ‘for 
cause’ protection – Layer One insulating the commissioners from the President, and Layer Two 
insulating the Board from the Commissioners—impose any more serious limitation upon the 
President’s power than one layer”). 
227 Id. at 3182 (emphasis in original). 
228 Id. at 3182–83. 
229 Id. at 3183 (emphasis in original). 
230 Id. at 3184. 
231 Id. (citing Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979)). 
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Morrison Court; Justice Kennedy took no part in the decision
232
 and 
Justice Scalia wrote the dissenting opinion.
233
 It seems as though the 
Court’s ideology about the separation of powers and the scope of 
executive power has changed since Morrison. Perhaps the key to why 
the Court framed the issue in Free Enterprise Fund as one involving 
two levels of for-cause removal was because the majority wanted to 
strike down the statute and to expand the executive branch’s power, 
but also wanted to avoid overruling Morrison. Without the presence 
of two levels of for-cause removal, the facts in Free Enterprise Fund 
closely resembled those of Morrison. Therefore, when the court of 
appeals framed the removal provision in Free Enterprise Fund as 
having two levels of for-cause removal, the majority latched onto that 
idea as a way of distinguishing the case before them from the 
Morrison line of cases. This enabled the majority to achieve its goal 
of striking down the statute while avoiding conflict with existing 
precedent.
234
  
Justice Breyer’s dissent drew attention to the Court’s questionable 
decision to read a for-cause removal requirement into the statute 
creating the SEC and its unwillingness to employ the avoidance 
doctrine.
235
 Justice Breyer has the right to raise his concerns and his 
viewpoint is persuasive, but his opinion is yet another example of a 
dissenting Justice highlighting the avoidance canon to further his or 
her own position and to criticize the majority. This sort of criticism 
underscores the discretionary nature of the canon. While it is widely 
understood that the canon is a persuasive rather than mandatory 
principle, drawing excessive attention to this fact diminishes the 
public’s perception of the validity of the canon and the persuasiveness 
of the Court’s future citations to it. 
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the Court’s opinion was the 
majority’s decision to read a for-cause removal requirement into the 
statute creating the SEC. The Court adopted an arguably incorrect 
statutory interpretation that ignored the plain language of the statute 
and Congress’s intent to strike down this statute. If the principles 
                                                                                                                 
232 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 658 (1988). 
233 Id. at 697 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
234 Even though the Court did not adhere to the avoidance canon in this case or in Citizens 
United, the Court’s approach in the two cases seems to conflict since one avoided overruling 
precedent and the other did not. Maybe one explanation for the difference in these approaches is 
that in Citizens United, it is likely that if the Court did not strike down the statute or overrule 
Austin or McConnell that another plaintiff would have filed a suit. In contrast, Free Enterprise 
Fund covers a more limited set of circumstances that cannot be challenged as easily. 
235 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3184 
(2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for reading the “for cause” requirement 
into the statute “that does not appear in the relevant statute and which Congress probably did not 
intend to write”). 
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behind the avoidance canon do not support a court’s decision to adopt 
an implausible statutory interpretation to uphold a statute, then the 
Court’s use of an implausible statutory interpretation to strike down a 
statute is even more troubling. The Court basically chose not to 
adhere to the avoidance canon to disregard the intent of one branch of 
government and to give another branch more power. This decision 
certainly undermines the Roberts Court’s minimalist reputation and 
raises serious concerns about the authority of the majority’s reasoning 
and the justices’ desire to push a particular agenda. 
III. THE BIG PICTURE: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF NAMUDNO, 
CITIZENS UNITED, AND FREE ENTERPRISE FUND ON THE AVOIDANCE 
CANON AND ON THE COURT ITSELF 
The Roberts Court’s use of the avoidance canon has been anything 
but consistent. In practical terms, the outcomes of the cases and the 
reasons that the Court applied the avoidance canon inconsistently may 
be a result of what was at issue in each case. While NAMUDNO dealt 
with the controversial issue of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 
neither Citizens United nor Free Enterprise Fund dealt with similar 
controversial issues. Given the less controversial nature of these 
cases, perhaps the conservative members of the Court felt more 
comfortable pushing the envelope and refusing to adhere to the 
avoidance canon to accomplish its ideological goals. Or, maybe 
Citizens United and Free Enterprise Fund turned out differently 
because in those cases Justice Kennedy, the Court’s current swing 
vote, was willing to vote with the conservative members of the Court, 
whereas he was reluctant to do so in NAMUDNO. Regardless of the 
reasons these cases turned out differently, the Court’s disparate 
approaches to the avoidance canon in each case, the way in which the 
justices wrote the opinions, and the increasingly flawed reasoning of 
these decisions have broad implications for the canon, its future 
legitimacy, and the public’s perception of the Court. 
The Court’s differing approaches to constitutional avoidance in 
NAMUDNO, Citizens United, and Free Enterprise Fund reveal the 
threat not only to the legitimacy of the avoidance canon, but also to 
the reputation of the Court. While the Court claimed that 
constitutional avoidance was its “usual practice” in NAMUDNO,236 it 
proceeded to give a cursory treatment to the canon in Citizens United 
and Free Enterprise Fund. The Court seems to vigorously defend and 
support the canon one minute, but gives superficial reasons for not 
                                                                                                                 
236 Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2508 (2009).  
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applying the canon in a specific case, or ignores the canon altogether 
the next minute. Chief Justice Roberts claims that the members of the 
Court are united in their allegiance to the avoidance canon,
237
 but 
Citizens United and Free Enterprise Fund suggest otherwise. The 
mixed messages these decisions send about the canon cause it to 
suffer because it conveys the perception that the justices’ personal 
ideologies are driving the decisions rather than the facts of a given 
case. These contradictory statements about, and approaches to, the 
canon cannot continue if the Court wants to preserve the canon’s 
legitimacy. While the canon may be discretionary, it cannot continue 
to be meaningful and persuasive if the justices constantly change the 
way in which it applies, or if they deliberately ignore it to promote 
their own agendas. Additionally, if the justices continue to use flawed 
reasoning and fail to adhere to the avoidance canon to promote a 
political agenda, the Roberts Court will lose its reputation as a 
minimalist court, if it has not done so already. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the decisions in NAMUDNO, Citizens United, and Free 
Enterprise Fund each address the avoidance canon in different 
contexts and each damages the canon in a distinct way, when these 
decisions are read together it is apparent that the Court is bringing 
constitutional avoidance back into the spotlight and is pushing the 
outer limits of the canon. The Court’s treatment of the canon in these 
opinions has diminished the canon’s persuasiveness and has damaged 
the legitimacy of the Court. The Justices, therefore, should evaluate 
whether they value the canon, reconsider the canon’s role in the 
Court’s jurisprudence, and think about the message that the Court 
sends when it employs the avoidance canon in inconsistent and 
implausible ways. If the Court values the avoidance canon and its 
own minimalist reputation, it should proceed with caution the next 
time it invokes or ignores the doctrine. 
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237 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 918 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) 
(noting that, when stakes in a particular case are high, the Court’s “standard practice is to refrain 
from addressing constitutional questions except when necessary to rule on particular           
claims . . . ”). 
† J.D. Candidate, 2012, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. 
